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Abstract
This paper is a positive theory of the distribution of income and the
growth rate of the economy. It builds on our earlier work, Meltzer and Richard (1981),
on the size of government. How does the distribution of income change as
an economy grows? To answer this question we build a model of a labor
economy in which consumers have diverse productivity. The government
imposes a linear income tax which funds equal per capita redistribution.
The tax rate is set in a sequence of single issue election in which the
median productivity individual is decisive. Economic growth is the re-
sult of using a learning by doing technology, so higher taxes discourage
labor causing the growth rate of the economy to fall. The distribution
of productivity can widen due to an exogenous increase in technological
specialization. This causes voters to raise the equilibrium tax rate and
reduce growth. The distribution of pre-tax income widens. We calibrate
the model using data from the U.S., U.K. and France. The results of the
calibration show that the model is consistent with the facts about changes
in income distribution over time in developed countries.
1 Introduction
How does the distribution of income change as economic growth changes? How
does growth change when governments raise tax rates to nance increased re-
We wish to thank V. V. Chari, Marvin Goodfriend, the seminar participants at the Whar-
ton School, and the Editor for useful comments.
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distribution? Economists have discussed these issues for decades, and they have
recently become major political issues in developed economies.
To answer these questions, we analyze a general equilibrium model under
certainty of a labor economy in which there is no capital or other means of
saving. Why a labor economy? Over the past two hundred years real wages
in industrialized countries have increased twenty-fold while the real return to
capital has remained about the same. The increase in real wages reects the
enormous increase in labor productivity based on the growth of "know-how".
Capital ows to the places where labor productivity is growing. Hence in our
view, capital accumulation is primarily the result, not the principal cause, of
the growth in output.
To analyze our hypothesis we construct a model where consumers di¤er in
their relative productivity. There is no labor mobility, i.e., if a consumer is
originally in the 10th percentile of productivity he will be there forever. What
changes is how much he produces per hour of labor. His output per hour can
change because exogenous technological change can spread or shrink the entire
distribution of relative productivity or because endogenous learning-by-doing
causes the absolute productivity of all workers to grow. The wage rate is equal
to absolute productivity so a consumers labor income is the wage rate multiplied
by his relative productivity adjusted labor.
There is a government in our model which levies a linear tax on labor in-
come. Tax revenues nance government spending for redistribution; the real
government budget is balanced. No matter how the government sets the linear
tax rate, a tax increase lowers aggregate hours worked, hence lowering current
aggregate income and consumption. Reducing aggregate hours worked reduces
the growth of wages because there is less learning-by-doing. Hence increased
taxes reduces the growth rate and widens the spread in the income distribution.
Reducing tax rates and redistribution brings the opposite response.
What is the political process by which the government sets the tax rate? In
our earlier work, Meltzer and Richard (1981), we rejected the idea of a benevo-
lent government choosing the tax rate to maximize some notion of social welfare
in favor of a majority rule election in which the median income voter is decisive
in a single issue election to choose the tax rate. We extend our work by showing
that the median voter is decisive in a series of majority rules elections for the
tax rate. At all times, all consumers are fully aware of the trade-o¤ of tax
changes on redistribution and growth. At all times, the median voter chooses
the trade-o¤ he likes best.
We calibrate the model using data for the U.S., the U.K., and France. The
data support the model in all three countries.
2 A Selective Literature Survey
The literature on economic growth and redistribution is large and varied. We
report on a sample that covers di¤erent approaches and reaches very di¤erent
conclusions.
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In a 1955 paper, Simon Kuznets used his extensive knowledge of income
data to conclude that economic growth rst increases the spread in the income
distribution. The reason is that when many unskilled workers enter the labor
force, the economy grows, prots rise, and higher incomes increase relatively and
absolutely. As workers acquire skills, their productivity and real wages increase
relative to prots, so the spread of the income distribution declines. Kuznets
conclusion has remained contentious in part because he did not produce a model
showing that his result held in general equilibrium and in part because of the
paucity of data he had available.
Many years later, Arthur Okun (1975) discussed the social decision of trading
some e¢ ciency or growth for more redistribution achieved by taxing higher
incomes. His discussion makes the cost, called the leaky bucket, exceed the
amount redistributed. His analysis, like Kuznets, concerns a one-time choice.
Our earlier work Meltzer and Richard (1981) departs from these ideas. In a
functioning democratic system, voters make the choice repeatedly not once and
for all times. The political choice of redistribution is like economic decisions that
optimizing consumers make repeatedly. They vote either to increase current
consumption by voting for a higher tax rate or they vote for growth and increased
future consumption by lowering tax rates and spending. Although our earlier
model is static, it is consistent with voters decisions. Sometimes they vote for
higher tax rates and spending and sometimes they do the opposite. No society
chooses once for all future time.
Much of the recent literature on endogenous economic growth in general
equilibrium focusses on the role of capital instead of labor. For example,
Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Bertola (1993), and Persson and Tabellini (1994)
all develop models of endogenous growth where consumers are endowed with
diverse amounts of capital. Labor is supplied inelastically.1 Capital is taxed
to fund redistribution. Higher taxes cause less growth by reducing the return
to capital. The greater the heterogeneity of the distribution of capital, the
higher is the preferred tax rate for the median voter. So, in general, voters
will not maximize economic growth. Instead, they vote to tax capital to -
nance redistribution, which slows growth. Both Alesina and Rodrick (1994)
and Persson and Tabellini (1994) examine the empirical implication of their
models. They both conclude that income inequality is empirically negatively
related to future economic growth. The reason is that as income inequality
rises, voters choose more redistribution, reducing the growth rate. Much of
this literature is summarized in the inuential book by Acemoglu (2009).
We think that the emphasis in explaining growth should be on labor pro-
ductivity not capital. Over the past 200 years real wages have increased 20 fold
while the return to capital has remained basically unchanged. Politically, if
capital determines growth it is di¢ cult to understand why the taxes on capital
income have risen, especially since capital is owned almost exclusively by the
upper half of the income distribution. So we choose to ignore capital and focus
1 In Persson and Tabellini (1994) there is no explicit labor.
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on labor productivity as the exclusive engine of growth.2
Another strand of the literature examines the implications of assuming high
incomes are rents. Treatment of high incomes as rent permits increased taxation
to nance redistribution without reducing productive activity. A special use of
rents is the claim that most high incomes result from inheritance of wealth
produced by an earlier generation and passed on. Evidence does not support
this claim both in the U.S. and other developed countries. Kaplan and Rauh,
(2013, 46, 48); Becker and Tomes (1979, 1158). Some work suggests that culture
and educational attainment of parents has more important inuence on later
generations than nancial inheritance. Becker and Tomes (1979, 1191), Corak
(2013, 80)
Another problem with treating high incomes, for example those of the top
one percent, as rent is that the population is not xed but changes. Piketty
(2014, 115-16) writes that capital transforms itself into rents as it accumu-
lates in large enough amounts. Saez (2013, 24) concludes that high top tax
rates reduce the pre-tax income gap without visible e¤ect on economic growth.
Corak (2013) shows that intergenerational mobility remains large in developed
countries like the U.S. and Canada. The main exception in the U.S. is the
least advantaged. In this paper we address the issue of why some of the least
advantaged have stagnant incomes. The least productive choose not to work,
so their incomes are all redistribution. Hence they do not acquire productive
skills.
Much of the discussion of the top one percent makes no mention of the other
99 percent. Often, the focus is on income from capital, which neglects labor
income, about 70% of total income. A very di¤erent explanation of the rising
share of income earned by the top one percent builds on work on superstars
by Rosen (1981). Rosen argued that technological change increases the relative
productivity of individuals with exceptional talent in using and developing the
new technology. Rosens work brings in relative productivity as an explanation
of the rising share of the top one percent. Developing new software, like Steve
Jobs and others, that create entire markets brings high rewards. Successfully
managing a bank or corporation with branches in 50 or 100 countries is an order
of magnitude more di¢ cult than managing in a single country or state. Ten
years is a long tenure in such jobs, so there is turnover not inheritance of high
income positions. Highly skilled surgeons adept at operating new technologies
should be included.
Major league sport stars in football, baseball, soccer, basketball and hockey
no longer perform before audiences restricted to a stadium. Television increased
their productivity. Kaplan and Rauh (2013, 42, Figure 3) show the substan-
tial increase in their incomes. Turnover is high; careers at the top are brief.
And there is little evidence that the super stars cede their places to their o¤-
spring. Rock musicians and entertainment stars often have similar careers with
high incomes for short duration. Income of super stars may explain some of
2Piguillem and Schneider (2013) add majority rule voting to the neoclassical growth model.
They show that the median voter is decisive assuming that the distribution of capital is strictly
proportional to the distribution of relative productivity.
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the increase in the relative earnings of the top one percent. We doubt that
it is a full explanation because the data after 1980 show that the rise in the
pre-tax share of the top one percent can be seen in the United States, the
United Kingdoms, Canada and Sweden but not in France and the Netherlands.
Roine and Waldenstrom (2006)
The share of pre-tax incomes received by the top one percent includes income
from reported capital gains. That makes it more volatile, rising in periods when
owners of shares choose to report gains in excess of losses.
There are substantial di¤erences in the relative shares of di¤erent income
quintiles when before and after tax and transfers are included. Most economic
theory considers consumption, based on permanent not current income, to be
a better measure of the economic component of well-being. Table 1 shows data
on pre- and post-tax incomes for the United States. The data for 1979 to 2010
are available on the Congressional Budget O¢ ce website.3
Before Tax (%)
Year 1979 1989 2007 2010
Lowest 20% 6.2 4.9 4.8 5.1
Middle 20% 15.8 15 13.4 14.2
Highest 20% 44.9 49.3 54.6 51.9
Highest 1% 8.9 12.2 18.7 14.9
After Tax (%)
Lowest 20% 7.4 5.7 5.6 6.2
Middle 20% 16.5 15.7 14.3 15.4
Highest 20% 42 47.3 51.4 48.1
Highest 1% 7.4 11.8 16.7 12.8
Source: CBO (2014)
Table 1: Selected Income Shares 1979-2010 (2010 Dollars)
The range of data in Table 1 is the range given by the CBO. We chose 1989
because it was the end of the Reagan growth years. We chose 2007 because it
is the peak year for the income share going to the top one percent. That year
is also the peak year for the after tax share of the top one percent.
The table makes clear that it matters considerably whether analysis uses
before or after tax income shares. Conceptually, income after tax and transfer
is closer to consumption. By 2010 the share of after tax income received by the
3http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44604
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lowest 20 percent (6.2 percent) is the same as the before tax share received in
1979. Income shares for the lowest and middle 20% fall until 2007, then rise;
the share of top one percent and 20 percent rise to 2007, then fall. Most of the
rise occurs during the period of relatively high growth in the 1990s. The change
is not likely to reect changes in the return to capital. The data seems more
consistent with productivity growth during the boom years.
Of interest in relation to recent discussion, the share of the upper income
groups declined from 2007 to 2010. These are years of relatively slow growth
combined with increased returns to equity capital and a recovery in many house
prices. Again, this suggests that productivity growth is more important than
return to capital in explaining income shares.
A main theme of Pikettys (2014 and elsewhere) work is that the tax rates on
income and wealth should be raised even though, at some points, he recognizes
that the higher rates would lower top incomes but not provide much revenue.
Few of the many discussions of his work point out that the choice of tax rate
should be an implication of a utility maximizing model, preferably a general
equilibrium model, such as in this paper.
Long before the Piketty book stimulated renewed interest in income distri-
bution and the choice of tax rate, Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) developed
general equilibrium models of income distribution across family generations.
Becker and Tomes (1979,1175) choose a linear tax structure and use revenues
for redistribution. They nd that even a progressive tax and public expendi-
ture system may widen the inequality of disposable income.Becker and Tomes
(1986, 533-4) note that some empirical work by Arthur Goldberger found that
the widening of inequality does not occur for several generations.
May increased government spending and taxation increase both growth and
redistribution? Of course, it may, but the empirical data in Alesina and Rodrick (1994)
and elsewhere shows that, in developed economies, the reverse is true. Govern-
ment spending is mainly for redistribution to augment consumption.
In our model, growth of labor productivity and labor income  learning
by doing  is a large factor, the largest, in explaining growth of output and
living standards. We do not challenge the role of capital or the implication
that the return to capital changes very little. The return to labor changes
much more. We do not impose our ideas of the desirable extent of income
distribution. The workers in our model are voters who choose their preferred
tax rate and redistribution. They are aware that an increased tax rate to nance
redistribution lowers investment in productivity enhancing investments that add
to their future consumption.
Our analysis ts the contours of growth experience. As workers learn, their
skills, productivity and incomes increase. They save more, acquire real assets
especially housing. They spend to educate their o¤spring, and they vote for or
against redistribution and taxation. In our earlier work,Meltzer and Richard (1981),
we showed that rational voters choose a tax rate consistent with the most basic
economic theory. They decide whether they want increased taxes to nance
more redistribution (consumption today), or lower tax rates to spur investment
and future consumption. In the growth model here, the same choice remains
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central.
3 The Economic Model
We begin by specifying consumersendowments. Consumers are innite-lived
and are endowed with di¤erent relative levels of productivity at time t = 0, in-
dexed by n; which is lognormally distributed: ln(n)   where  is the standard
cumulative normal distribution function. Exogenenous changes in technology,
such as the computerization of production experienced in developed economies
during the past 40 years, causes changes in the distribution of relative produc-
tivity over time. We use the state variable st to determine the level of exogenous
technological change. A consumer with productivity n at t = 0 has relative pro-
ductivity nst at time t; if st > 1 the dispersion of relative productivity increases
and if st < 1 the dispersion decrease. Notice that the distribution of relative
productivity is always lognormal because ln(nst) = st ln(n)  (0; s2t ): Hence
the median relative productivity is xed for all time at e0 = 1; but mean rela-
tive productivity, nt = e
1
2 s
2
t > 1; changes as st changes. Besides productivity
each consumer is endowed with one unit of time at all t: Each consumer must
continuously allocate his one unit of time to labor, `t(n); or leisure, 1  `t(n):
At time t; the labor market pays a wage wt per unit of productivity-adjusted
labor, so labor income is wtnst`t(n) for a consumer with productivity n: Equiv-
alently, wtnst is the absolute productivity of a consumer with relative produc-
tivity n at time t: Hence the median relative productivity worker with n = 1
experiences rising absolute productivity wt: The growth of the wage rate, wt; is
endogenous and due to a learning-by-doing technology. Let Lt be the average
number of productivity units worked at time t :
Lt =
1Z
0
nst`t(n) exp(  12 (lnn)2)
n
p
2
dn: (1)
Then wage growth is proportional to Lt :
dwt
dt
= gtLtwt; (2)
where gt is an exogenous growth productivity factor.
The level of the growth productivity factor gt is exogenous, determined by
the business cycle, with dynamics given by
dgt
dt
= (st; gt; t): (3)
The technology dispersion state variable has dynamics
dst
dt
= (st; gt; t): (4)
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Taken together equations (2), (3) and (4) describe the evolution of the state of
the economy where xt = (st; wt; gt) are the state variables.
There is a government which levies a linear tax on income at rate  t at
time t and uses the proceeds for redistribution, wtt; equally per capita. The
governments budget is balanced so
t =  tLt: (5)
The governments choice of tax rate determines the disincentive to work, which,
in turn, determines the rate of learning-by doing and the growth rate of the
economy. We assume that the tax rate is a function only of the state of the
economy:
 t = (xt): (6)
We now return to consumer welfare maximization. Since there is no capital
or other means of saving, everyone continuously consumes their entire income.
Hence a consumer with productivity n consumes
ct(n) = twt + (1   t)wtnst`t(n); (7)
where twt is amount of redistribution he receives at time t and (1  t)wtnst`t(n)
is his after-tax labor income at time t: A consumer with relative lifetime pro-
ductivity n maximizes his lifetime utility of consumption and leisure which we
assume to be time additive and logarithmic in consumption and leisure:
V n(xt; t; ) = max
`(n)
Z 1
t
e u [ ln(cu(n)) + (1  ) ln(1  `u(n))] du; (8)
where,  2 (0; 1); `t(n) is his labor decision at time t, ct(n); given by equation(7),
is his consumption at time t, and  is the discount rate. The discounted lifetime
utility value, V n(xt; t; ) is conditioned on the tax function  ;which we have not
yet specied. Each individual is a price taker in the labor market, takes as given
(A) the state processes for xt shown in equations (2), (3), and (4), (B) the tax
function equation (6), and (C) redistribution, equation(5), and chooses f`t(n)g
to maximize utility. The standard Bellman equation for optimal control is
0 = max
`t(n)
fe t[ ln(ct(n)) + (1  ) ln(1  `t(n))]
+V nt + V
n
s t(st; gt; t) + V
n
w gtwtLt + V
n
g t(st; gt; t)g: (9)
Substituting equation (7) into equation (9) and di¤erentiating by `t(n);yields
the standard rst-order condition:
`t(n) =   t(1  )
nst(1   t) : (10)
The maximum fraction of time devoted to working is ; as can be seen by setting
t = 0 in equation (10). Since labor must be positive there is a minimum level
8
of relative productivity, t; below which consumers are voluntarily unemployed,
living on their redistribution:
t =

t(1  )
(1   t)
1=st
: (11)
We call t the voluntary unemployment productivity.4 Optimal consumption
is
ct(n) = twt; for n < t: (12a)
= (t + (1   t)nst)wt; for n  t: (12b)
Notice that for all states xt; and hence all choices of t and  t; that consumption
is increasing in n for those who work:
c0t(n) = 0; for n < t: (13a)
= (1   t)stnst 1wt > 0; for n  t: (13b)
Later we exploit equations (13) to establish that the median voter is decisive in
continuous elections determining the tax rate.
It is important to note that the time-separable logarithmic utility function
causes consumers to make optimal myopic decisions in the dynamic economy.
By myopic we mean that it is optimal for each consumer to condition his la-
bor/leisure decision on the current level of wages, taxes, redistribution and
relative productivity, and not on any past or future levels of the economy, in
order to allocate optimally his time to labor or leisure. Equations (10) and
(12) show that each consumers optimal choice of labor and thus consumption
depends only on the current level of wages, wt, taxes,  t; redistribution, t; and
relative productivity, nst : Consumers recognize that as the state of the economy
changes, so do wages, taxes, redistribution and relative productivity, but their
choice of labor hours worked at time t does not depend on their past experience
or on how they see the future evolving.
Prior to determining how the tax rate is set, we rst show that selecting t
is an equivalent to selecting  t: First the optimal average hours worked, Lt; can
be found by substituting equations (10) and (11) into equation (1):
Lt =
1Z
t
(nst   stt ) exp(  12 (lnn)2)
n
p
2
dn
Lt(t; st) =  [nt(  ln t + st)  stt (  ln t)] : (14)
It is obvious from equation (14) that Lt is a function only of st and t: Later
we need the partial derivatives of Lt(t; st) with respect to t and st :
@Lt
@t
=  stst 1t (  ln t) < 0 (15)
4Of course, outside our model there can be additional involuntary unemployment.
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and
@Lt
@st
=  [stnt(  ln t + st) + nt(  ln t + st)  (ln t)stt (  ln t)] > 0; 5
(16)
where  is the unit normal density function. Substituting equation (5) for t
into equation (11) and then solving for  t gives:
 t =
stt
stt + (1  )Lt
: (17)
So  t is completely determined by the state variables xt and t: In fact, given
the state variables xt; the relationship between  t and t is one-to-one as can
be seen by showing that  t is a strictly increasing function of t :
d t
dt
=
2(1  )stst 1t nt(  ln t + st)
(stt + (1  )Lt)2
> 0: (18)
Hence the mapping from t to  t is continuous and strictly increasing, so that
setting t is equivalent to setting  t:
Armed with he fact that setting t is equivalent to setting  t; we determine
redistribution, t; labor, `t(n); and consumption, ct(n) as functions of t and
the states, xt: Substituting equation (17) into equation (5) gives:
t =
stt Lt
stt + (1  )Lt
: (19)
Substituting equation (11) into equation (10) we nd that
`t(n) = (1  
st
t
nst
): (20)
Finally, substituting equations (20), (17), and (19) into equation (12) gives:
ct(n) = wtLt
stt
stt + (1  )Lt
; for n < t: (21a)
= wtLt
stt + (1  )nst
stt + (1  )Lt
; for n  t: (21b)
Hence everything in this economy is a function of the state variables, xt; and
t.
Lastly, we determine the mean number of unadjusted labor units worked per
capita, `t :
`t =
1Z
t
`t(n) exp(  12 (lnn)2)
n
p
2
dn (22)
=
1Z
t
(1  stt =nst) exp(  12 (lnn)2)
n
p
2
dn (23)
=  [(  ln t)  stt nt(  ln t   st)] : (24)
5Recall that t < 1 so that   ln(t) > 0:
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Hence, the fraction of full time labor worked per capita at time t is `t= and
the fraction of full time labor worked per employed person, Lt; is
Lt = 1  
st
t nt(  ln t   st)
(  ln t) : (25)
4 The Distribution of Pre-Tax Income and After-
Tax Consumption
We can now show that regardless of how tax rates are determined, the distri-
bution of pre-tax income widens as taxes rise. This widening has nothing to
do with technological change or the privileges of the rich. The widening of
the distribution of income is the direct consequence of the incentives created by
increasing taxes and redistribution. The pre-tax income of a consumer with
relative productivity n at time t is
It(n) = 0 for n < t; (26a)
= wtn
st`t(n) for n  t: (26b)
Substituting equation (20) into equation (26) gives
It(n) = 0 for n < t; (27a)
= wt(n
st   stt ) for n  t: (27b)
Assuming that he works, the median consumers income is
It(1) = wt(1  stt ) : (28)
In equilibrium, the average pre-tax income of all consumers, both those who
work and those who live on redistribution, is
It = wtLt: (29)
Higher taxes causes the average income of all consumers (which in equilibrium
must equal the average consumption of all consumers) to fall:
@It
@t
=  wtstst 1t (  ln t) < 0; (30)
where we have used equation (15) for @Lt@t :
A commonly used measure of the dispersion of income is the ratio of mean
to median income:
rt =
It
It(1)
=
Lt
(1  stt )
: (31)
Di¤erentiating with respect to t; we get that
drt
dt
=
st
st 1
t [ntN(  ln t + st) N(  ln t)]
(1  stt )2
> 0: (32)
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so that the ratio of mean to median income rises as tax rates increase. In fact
all consumers with productivity above (below) median increase (reduce) their
income relative to median income as taxes rise:
d(It(n)=It(1))
dt
= 0 for n < t; (33a)
=
st
st 1
t (n
st   1)
(1  stt )2
for n  t: (33b)
Another commonly used measure of the dispersion of pre-tax income is the
fraction earned by the top k%. The upper k% begins with the consumer with
relative productivity
n(k) = exp(  1(k)): (34)
For example, the upper 1% begins with relative productivity n(0:01) = exp(  1(0:01))
or n(0:01)  e2:33 and the top 10% begins with productivity n(0:1)  e1:28:
Let P denote the total population so that (n)P equals the number of consumers
with relative productivity n: The total income of the top k% of consumers is
eIt(k) = Pwt Z 1
n(k)
(nst   stt )
exp(  12 (lnn)2)p
2n
dn
= Pwt [nt(  lnn(k) + st)  stt k] : (35)
The fraction of pre-tax income earned by the top k% is
 t(k) =
eIt(k)
PIt
=
nt(  lnn(k) + st)  stt k
nt(  ln t + st)  stt (  ln t)
: (36)
Di¤erentiating  t(k) with respect to t shows that
 t(k)
dt
=
st
st 1
t ntk(  ln t)
(nt(  ln t + st)  stt (  ln t))2

(  lnn(k) + st)
(  lnn(k))  
(  ln t + st)
(  ln t)

> 0;
(37)
which is positive for n(k) > t: Hence as taxes rise so does the income share
of the top k%:
The number of consumers in the top k% is Pk, so per capita income in the
top k% is bIt(k) = eIt(k)
Pk
=
wt [nt(  lnn(k) + st)  k]
k
(38)
Hence the ratio of per capita income of consumers in the top k% relative to
median pre-tax income isbIt(k)
It(1)
=
nt(  lnn(k) + st)  stt k
(1  stt )k
: (39)
Di¤erentiating equation (39) with respect to t shows that:
d(bIt(k)=It(1))
dt
= st
st 1
t
nt(  lnn(k) + st)  k
k(1  stt )2
> 0: (40)
12
Again, "the rich get richer" relative to the median as taxes rise. Again, this is
an inevitable consequence of taxation and redistribution.
There is much discussion in the media, and even among academics, of how
rising income dispersion is evidence of a more "unequal" society. This is, of
course, very misleading because funds collected in taxes are redistributed so
that the distribution of consumption actually narrows with increased taxes.
The welfare implication of increased taxation is a more equal, "fair" society,
despite an increase in the dispersion of pre-tax incomes. Using equation (21)
we calculate the ratio of consumption of a consumer with relative productivity
n to the median consumption:
ct(n)
ct(1)
=
stt
stt + 1  
for n < t; (41)
=
stt + (1  )nst
stt + 1  
for n  t (42)
In fact all consumers with productivity above (below) median reduce (increase)
their consumption relative to median consumption as taxes rise:
d(ct(n)=ct(1))
dt
=
(1  )stst 1t
(stt + 1  )2
> 0 for n < t; (43a)
=
(1  )stst 1t (1  nst)
(stt + 1  )2
for n  t: (43b)
What about the top k%? The per capita consumption of the top k% is
bct(k) = wtLtstt (  lnn(k)) + (1  )nt(  lnn(k) + st)
k(stt + (1  )Lt)
(44)
The per capita consumption of the top k% falls relative to median consumption
as taxes increase:
d(bct(k)=ct(1))
dt
=  (1  )st
st 1
t (nt(  lnn(k) + st)  (  lnn(k)))
k(stt + 1  )2
< 0
(45)
5 The Median Voter
Until now all consumer have been price takers who have no inuence over govern-
ment tax policy. Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) shows that if the ordering
of individual consumption is increasing in n; for any choice of t and  t, then the
median voter is decisive in a majority rule election to set the tax rate.6 We have
already shown in equation (13) that for any choice of t and  t; consumption is
6Roberts (2015) extends his work on majority rules to clubs. In a club, the membership
is endogenous because current members choose the new members in majority rules elections.
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strictly increasing in n for those who work. So the median voter is continuously
decisive in elections for f tg:
We now turn to analyzing how the median voter would prefer to set tax
rates. The median voters lifetime utility maximization problem is now
V (xt; t) = maxfu;`ug
Z 1
t
e u [ ln(cu(1)) + (1  ) ln(1  `u(1))] du; (46)
where we have suppressed the superscript V 1: The standard Bellman equation
for optimal control is revised to
0 = max
ft;`tg
fe t[ ln(ct(1))) + (1  ) ln(1  `t(1))]
+Vt + Vs(st; gt; t) + VwgtwtLt + Vg(st; gt; t)g (47)
We can simplify equation (47) by dening
V (xt; t) = e
 tJ(xt; t); (48)
which we substitute into equation (47) to nd
0 = max
ft;`tg
f ln(ct(1))) + (1  ) ln(1  `t(1))
 J + Jt + Js(st; gt; t) + JwgtwtLt + Jg(st; gt; t)g (49)
Substituting equation (21) evaluated at n = 1 for the median voters optimal
consumption and equation (20) evaluated at n = 1 for the median voters opti-
mal labor into equation (49) we nd
0 = max
t
f ln+  lnwt +  lnLt + ln(stt + 1  )   ln(stt + (1  )Lt)
 J + Jt + Js(st; gt; t) + JwwtLtgt + Jg(st; gt; t)g: (50)
We now make a substitution of variables to make analyzing the model easier.
Let zt denote the dispersion-adjusted voluntary unemployment productivity
zt = 
st
t : (51)
In terms of zt; aggregate hours worked is
Lt(zt; st) = 

nt(
  ln zt
st
+ st)  zt(  ln zt
st
)

: (52)
The partial derivatives of Lt(zt; st) are
@Lt(zt; st)
@zt
=  (  ln zt
st
) < 0 (53)
and
@Lt(zt; st)
@st
= stnt(
  ln zt
st
+ st) + zt(  ln zt
st
) > 0: (54)
14
In terms of zt; the tax rate is
 t =
zt
zt + (1  )Lt(zt; st) ; (55)
so that
d t
dzt
= 2(1  ) nt(
  ln zt
st
+ st)
(zt + (1  )Lt(zt; st))2 > 0: (56)
We see from equations (55) and (56) that voting for zt is equivalent to voting
for  t given the states xt: Substituting equation (51) into equation (50) gives
0 = max
zt
f ln+  lnwt +  lnLt(zt; st) + ln(zt + 1  )   ln(zt + (1  )Lt(zt; st))
 J + Jt + Js(st; gt; t) + JwwtgtLt(zt; st) + Jg(st; gt; t)g: (57)
We try the solution
J(xt; t) =


lnwt + j(gt; st; t): (58)
Substituting equation (58) into equation (57) gives
0 = max
zt
f ln+  lnLt + ln(zt + 1  )   ln(zt + (1  )Lt)
 j + jt + js(st; gt; t) + gt

Lt + jg(st; gt; t)g: (59)
Using equation (53) we calculate the derivative with respect to zt of the right-
hand-side of equation (59) as
H(zt; st; gt) = 
"
 (  ln ztst )
Lt
+
1
zt + 1    
(1  (1  )(  ln ztst ))
zt + (1  )Lt  


gt(  ln zt
st
)
#
:
(60)
The median voters choice of zt (and hence of  t) is that zt (st; gt) which solves
the rst order condition
H(zt ; st; gt) = 0 (61)
and, we assume, the second order condition
Hz(z

t ; st; gt) < 0: (62)
We cannot solve equation (61) explicitly for zt (st; gt); but instead use equation
(61) as an implicit equation for zt (st; gt):
6 The Size of Government
We measure the size of government by its tax share. We show that an increase
in the growth productivity factor, ceteris paribus, causes the median voter to
choose lower taxes. Conversely, an increase in the dispersion of relative pro-
ductivity, st; ceteris paribus, causes the median voter to choose higher taxes.
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To see this we calculate the signs of the derivatives of zt (st; gt) with respect to
the states. First, di¤erentiate equation (61) with respect to gt :
Hz
@zt
@gt
  
2

(  ln zt
st
) = 0; (63)
which we rearrange to nd that
@zt
@gt
=
2(  ln ztst )
Hz
< 0: (64)
Equation (64) implies that the median voter choose lower zt ; which implies
lower taxes, when the growth productivity factor increases. Next, we need the
partial derivative of H with respect to st :
Hs = 
"
(  ln ztst )
L2t
+
(1  )(1  (1  )(  ln ztst ))
(zt + (1  )Lt)2
@Lt
@st
#
 ( 
ln zt
st
) ln zt
s2t

zt
Lt(zt + (1  )Lt) +
gt


> 0: (65)
Assuming the median voter works, zt < 1 so that ln zt < 0; implying that
Hs > 0: Taking the derivative of equation (61) with respect to st; we get
Hz
@zt
@st
+Hs = 0; (66)
which implies that
@zt
@st
=  Hs
Hz
> 0: (67)
Equation (67) implies that the median voter choose higher zt ; which implies
higher taxes, when technology dispersion increases.
7 Economic Growth
Armed with the medians voters choice of the tax rate, we can calculate the
e¤ect of taxes on growth. The growth rate of the economy at time t; denoted
t; equals the growth rate of average income, which is given by equation(29).
t =
1
It
dIt
dt
=
1
wt
dwt
dt
+
1
Lt(st; gt)
dLt(z

t (st; gt); st)
dt
= gtLt +
1
Lt

@Lt
@st
+
@Lt
@zt
@zt
@st

(st; gt; t) +
1
Lt
@Lt
@zt
@zt
@gt
(st; gt; t):(68)
There are three e¤ects on economic growth captured in equation (68). The
rst term, gtLt; is the growth rate due to current learning by doing, which is
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smaller the higher are taxes since dLtdzt < 0: The second term captures the e¤ect
of changes in the dispersion of relative productivity on growth. The e¤ect of
an increase in dispersion, st; on the growth rate of the economy is ambiguous
since the bracketed term in equation (68) is of indeterminate sign because @Lt@st ,
which is the direct e¤ect of st on aggregate labor, is always positive, but @Lt@zt
@zt
@st
;
which is the indirect e¤ect of increasing taxes, is negative. The third term is
positive whenever learning-by-doing productivity is increasing, (st; gt; t) > 0;
in this case the economy grows faster because both @Lt@zt < 0 and
@zt
@gt
< 0:
8 Calibration
We now calibrate our model. Our model has four calculated outputs for which
we have be able to nd empirical analogues:
1. The growth rate of the economy, t; which is calculated using equation
(68).
2. The fraction of full time labor per employed person, Lt; which is calculated
using equation (25).
3. A measure of income dispersion. Either
(a) The ratio of mean to median income, rt;which is calculated using
equation (31), or
(b) The fraction of income earned by the top 10%,  t(0:1); calculated
using equation(36).7
4. The tax rate,  t;which is calculated using equation (17).
The empirical analogues we found are
1. Real annual growth rate of per capita GDP, denoted  t.
2. The average annual hours worked per engaged person divided by the an-
nual hours comprising full time employment, F ; the ratio is denoted t.
3. Either
(a) The ratio of mean to median annual household income, denoted Rt;
or
(b) The annual income share of the top 10% taken from the The World
Top Income Database, denoted 	t.
7We think that the household income data is likely to be better measured because it is
based on a census bureau survey of the US population or the ONS survey in the UK. In
contrast, the income fraction of the top 10% is taken from income tax returns. Changes in
tax laws and non-compliance means the tax data are not necessarily a consistent sample from
year to year.
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4. Annual total government expenditures as a fraction of GDP, Tt.8
We calibrate the model using data from three countries, the US, the UK
and France. These are the only countries where we have been able to nd the
required data over a reasonably long time period. US data is drawn from two
overlapping periods: from 1967 to 2011, during which time the Census Bureau
has calculated mean to median annual household income; and a longer time
period from 1950 to 2011 for which we have the income share of the top 10%.
Similarly, for the UK we draw data from two overlapping periods: from 1977 to
2011, during which time the O¢ ce of National Statistics has calculated mean to
median annual household income9 ; and a longer time period from 1962 to 2011
for which we have the income share of the top 10%.10 In France we use data
for the annual income share of the top 10% from 1978 - 2009.11 The choice of
estimation periods reects the rst and last dates when the necessary data are
available.12 Our data sources are in Table 2.
France UK US
Real GDP per Capita Growth Rate INSEE MW FRED
Productivity Index (TFP) FRED FRED FRED
Mean Ann. Hours per Engaged Person FRED FRED FRED
Mean & Median Household Income EuroStat ONS CB
Government Expenditures/GDP EuroStat UPS FRED
Income Share of Top 10% WTID WTID WTID
Table 2: Data Sources. INSEE is the French National Institute of Statistics
and Economic Studies. MW is MeasuringWorth.com. FRED is the Federal
Reserve Economic Data at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. EuroStat is
the economic database of the European Commission. ONS is the UKs O¢ ce
of National Statistics. CB is the US Census Bureau. UPS is UKPublicSpend-
ing.co.uk. WTID is the The World Top Incomes Database.
Since our model has no uncertainty, we assume that the di¤erence be-
tween the models output and the analogous data are independent, normally-
distributed, measurement errors . Measurement errors are, in fact, likely to be
8Measuring the e¤ective tax rate as government expenditure/GDP was suggested by Milton
Friedman.
9Mean and median household income data in the UK are available only after 1977. Follow-
ing the European Union standard, the data are adjusted for changing household composition,
including the number of people in the household and number of unemployed people. So the
UK mean to median household income data is a close, but not perfect, analogue of the US
Census Bureau data.
10Prior to 1962, the data for income share of the top 10% in the UK are spotty.
11Data for total French government expenditures begins in 1978. We end in 2009 because
that is the last year in which the income share of the top 10% is reported. Mean and median
household income data are only available from 1995 onward, which we think is too short a
time period.
12Our data is available in an Excel spreadsheet at
https://fnce.wharton.upenn.edu/prole/972/. Also available is Matlab code for the
calibration.
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signicant since much of our data is calculated by governments based on surveys
of households and industries. Hence we assume that
"t = [ t   t;t   Lt; Rt   rt; Tt    t]; 13 (69)
where "it  (0; 2) are i.i.d. The log-likelihood function is
L =
NX
t=1
 1
2
(4 ln(2) + 4 ln(2) + "t"
0
t=
2): (70)
For each country (and each time period in the US and the UK), we want to
maximize L by nding the states ft; stg; the taste parameter  and the number
of annual hours equivalent to full time labor, F: It is well-known that we can
maximize the likelihood by minimizing the sum of squared errors
SSE =
NX
t=1
"t"
0
t (71)
and that the maximum likelihood estimator of 2 is
b2 = SSE
4N
: (72)
Finally, we set the time discounting factor  = 4%:14
The third state variable which is median productivity, wt; is computed from
the productivity index, Pt: We equate average total output calculated by using
productivity-adjusted labor, equation (29), with average total output calculated
using unadjusted labor:
It = wtLt = Pt`t (73)
Solving equation (73) we get
wt =
Pt`t
Lt
: (74)
Unfortunately, because wt does not enter into any consumers optimal decision
making and because there is no reported data on median productivity, we cannot
compare our estimated values of wt to any actual data.
We minimize SSE by a numerical search. The search steps are:
1. Make a starting guess for the states, ft; stg; and parameters,  and F:
2. For each t; solve equation (61) for gt.
3. Compute t; `t; rt and  t.
13 If we are using data on the income share of the top 10%, then substitute 	t    t for
Rt   rt:
14We cannot estimate  because it is not identied unless we have observations on the
productivity factor gt; which is not observable.
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4. Compute the sum of squared errors.
5. Update the states, ft; stg;and parameters,  and F; using a Nelder-Mead
algorithm.
6. Repeat steps (2) - (5) until convergence.
When reporting the results of each of the searches we show a graph with four
panels, corresponding to the four comparisons of model to data listed above
and a second graph showing the state variables wt; gt; st and the voluntary
unemployment productivity, t:
8.1 The United States
We estimate our model for the United States over two di¤erent time periods.
During the rst period from 1967 to 2011 we use annual observations on real per
capita GDP growth rate, average annual hours worked per engaged person, the
ratio of mean to median household income, and the ratio of total government
expenditures to GDP. During the second, longer period, from 1950 to 2011,
we substitute the income share of the top 10% for the ratio of mean to median
household income which is not available prior to 1967.
8.1.1 US Mean-to-Median Ratio Data
We begin with data from the US from 1967 - 2011. Figure 1 shows a comparison
of actual data and model calculations. Obviously the ts of the model to the
data are excellent. The root-mean-squared-error (RMSE), b; is only 1.1%. The
r2 for the t of actual data to the model are 54.0%, 76.4%, 97.9%, and 88.8%,
for growth, hours per employed person, mean to median income, and the tax
rate, respectively. The downward trend in hours worked per employed person
reects an international trend as we see below. Mean to median income and
government expenditures as a fraction of GDP have both trended upward as a
result of increased dispersion in relative productivity as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows the optimal estimated states, fgt; st; wtg; and t; from 1967
- 2011. The productivity growth multiplier, shown in Panel 1, increased from
1967, reached a peak in 2000, and declined afterward. The dispersion of relative
productivity, shown in Panel 2, increased steadily from 1967 through 2000, but
has leveled o¤ since then. Panel 3 shows two productivity indexes. The rst
is the standard measure of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). In the US TFP
started a sharp increase in the early 1980s and has grown steadily thereafter, but
with dips for recessions. The second productivity index is the state variable,
wt;which measures the productivity of themedian worker. Median productivity,
wt; declines slightly until the 1980s, but after that begins a steady upward climb
mimicking the rise in TFP. The spread between TFP and median productivity,
however, continues to widen throughout. Panel 4 shows that there has been
a steady upward trend in the productivity cuto¤ for voluntary unemployment
corresponding to the upward trend in redistribution.
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Figure 1: A comparison of actual data and model calculations for the US 1967
- 2011. Panel 1 shows a comparison of the actual rate of real per capita GDP
growth to the models calculated rate of real per capita income growth, t:
Panel 2 shows a comparison of the actual average fraction of full time hours
worked per engaged person to the models calculated average fraction of full
time worked per employed person, Lt: Panel 3 shows a comparison of the actual
ratio of mean to median household income to the models calculated ratio of
mean to median income, rt: Panel 4 shows a comparison of the actual ratio of
total government expenditures to GDP to the models linear tax rate,  t:
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Figure 2: Estimated state variables in the US from 1967 - 2011. The rst
panel shows the productivity growth multiplier. The second panel show the
standard deviation or dispersion of productivity. The third panel shows two
productivity indexes: TFP and wt which is based on the productivity of the
median worker. The fourth panel shows the productivity of the last person
who voluntarily chooses not to work.
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8.1.2 US Top 10% Data
To get a longer time period for estimation we have to substitute the income
fraction of the top 10% for the ratio of mean to median household income in all
three countries. Figure 3 reports the estimation in the US from 1950 - 2011.
The RMSE of 1.45% is higher using top 10% income data than using the ratio
of mean to median income. The r2 for the t of actual data to the model
are 88.5%, 90.5%, 78.3%, and 96.9%, for growth, hours per employed person,
income share of the top 10%, and the tax rate, respectively. The data trends
are similar to 1967 - 2011, except we see that the fraction of income earned by
the top 10% did not begin its upward march until the 1980s.
Figure 4 shows the estimated optimal states in the US from 1950-2011. The
interesting di¤erence between these charts and Figure 2 is in the two productiv-
ity indexes shown in Panel 3. Using top 10% income share data over a longer
time period shows that TFP and median productivity tracked each other closely
until the early 1980s at which point the spread between TFP and median pro-
ductivity began to widen substantially. This is about the same time that the
income share of the top 10% began its steep climb.
8.2 United Kingdom
We estimate our model for the United Kingdom over two di¤erent time periods.
During the rst period from 1977 to 2011 we use annual observations on real per
capita GDP growth rate, average annual hours worked per engaged person, the
ratio of mean to median household income, and the ratio of total government
expenditures to GDP. During the second, longer period, from 1962 to 2011,
we substitute the income share of the top 10% for the ratio of mean to median
household income which is not available prior to 1977.
8.2.1 UK Mean-to-Median Ratio data
We begin with data from the UK from 1977 to 2011. Figure 5 shows a compar-
ison of actual data and model calculations. The ts of the model to the data
are very good, but not as good as the US. The RMSE is 1.89%. The r2 are
60.0%, 23.3%, 88.6%, and 89.8%, for growth, hours per employed person, mean
to median income, and the tax rate, respectively. We do not t very well the
downward trend in hours worked per employed person. Since 1990, mean to
median income and government expenditures as a fraction of GDP have both
trended upward as a result of increased dispersion in productivity as shown in
Figure 6.
Figure 6 shows the optimal estimated states, fgt; st; wtg; and t; from 1977
- 2011. The productivity growth multiplier, shown in Panel 1, increased from
1977, approximately leveled o¤ form 1988 - 2004 and declined afterward. The
dispersion of relative productivity, shown in Panel 2, increased steadily from
1977 through 1988, but has leveled o¤ since then. Panel 3 shows that, as in
the US, both TFP and wt increase beginning in the early 1980s, but that TFP
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Figure 3: A comparison of actual data and model calculations for the US 1950
- 2011. Panel 1 shows a comparison of the actual rate of real per capita GDP
growth to the models calculated rate of real per capita income growth, t:
Panel 2 shows a comparison of the actual average fraction of full time hours
worked per engaged person to the models calculated average fraction of full
time worked per employed person, Lt: Panel 3 shows a comparison of the actual
share of income earned by the top 10% to the models calculated fraction of
total income earned by the top 10%, t(0:1): Panel 4 shows a comparison of the
actual ratio of total government expenditures to GDP to the models linear tax
rate,  t:
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Figure 4: Estimated state variables in the US from 1950 - 2011. The rst
panel shows the productivity growth multiplier. The second panel show the
standard deviation or dispersion of productivity. The third panel shows two
productivity indexes: TFP and wt which is based on the productivity of the
median worker. The fourth panel shows the relative productivity of the last
person who voluntarily chooses not to work.
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Figure 5: A comparison of actual data and model calculations for the UK 1977
- 2011. Panel 1 shows a comparison of the actual rate of real per capita GDP
growth to the models calculated rate of real per capita income growth, t: Panel
2 shows a comparison of the actual average fraction of full time hours worked per
engaged person to the models calculated average fraction of full time worked
per employed person, Lt: Panel 3 shows the actual the ratio of mean to median
income compared to the models calculated ratio of mean to median income, rt:
Panel 4 shows a comparison of the actual ratio of total government expenditures
to GDP to the models linear tax rate,  t:
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grows faster than median productivity. Panel 4 shows that in the UK, like in
the US, there has been a steady upward trend in the productivity cuto¤ for
voluntary unemployment.
8.2.2 UK Top 10% Data
Figure 7 shows a comparison of actual data and model calculations. Again
the RMSE of 2.54% is higher using top 10% income data than using the ratio
of mean to median income. The r2 for the t of actual data to the model
are 68.3%, 71.3%, 85.0%, and 40.3%, for growth, hours per employed person,
income share of the top 10%, and the tax rate, respectively. As in the US, the
income share of the top 10% began trending upward in the 1980s, although the
reported shares are lower in the UK than the US.
Figure 8 shows the estimated optimal states in the UK from 1962 - 2011.
Notice in Panel 2 that, as in the US, relative productivity dispersion began to
increase in the 1980s coincident with the increase of the income share of the top
10%. In panel 3 we see that, using top 10% of income data, measured median
productivity, wt; has not changed much in the UK since 1962, while TFP has
risen substantially.
8.3 France
We estimate our model for France from 1978 - 2009. We use annual observations
on real per capita GDP growth rate, average annual hours worked per engaged
person, the income share of the top 10%, and the burden of government which is
the ratio of total government expenditures to GDP. Figure 9 shows a comparison
of actual data and model calculations. The RMSE of 1.55% is better than the
UK (using top 10% income data), but not as good as the US. The r2 for the t
of actual data to the model are 92.3%, 77.7%, -130.0%, and 77.9%, for growth,
hours per employed person, income share of the top 10%, and the tax rate,
respectively. The t of the model to the actual income share of the top 10%
is poor; since 1995 the model requires a larger share for the top 10% than the
tax data shows. Of course, this discrepancy could be due to under-reporting of
income on tax returns in France.
Figure 10 shows the estimated optimal states in France from 1978 - 2009.
Notice in Panel 2 that, as in the US and UK, relative productivity dispersion
began to increase in the 1980s coincident with the increase of the income share
of the top 10%. The biggest di¤erence between France and the UK or US,
is seen in Panel 3 which shows that TFP has been approximately stagnant in
France since 1978, but that median productivity,wt; has declined substantially.
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Figure 6: Estimated state variables in the UK from 1977 - 2011. The rst
panel shows the productivity growth multiplier. The second panel show the
standard deviation or dispersion of productivity. The third panel shows two
productivity indexes: TFP and wt which is based on the productivity of the
median worker. The fourth panel shows the productivity of the last person
who voluntarily chooses not to work.
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Figure 7: A comparison of actual data and model calculations for the UK 1962
- 2011. Panel 1 shows a comparison of the actual rate of real per capita GDP
growth to the models calculated rate of real per capita income growth, t:
Panel 2 shows a comparison of the actual average fraction of full time hours
worked per engaged person to the models calculated average fraction of full
time worked per employed person, Lt: Panel 3 shows a comparison of the actual
share of income earned by the top 10% to the models calculated fraction of
total income earned by the top 10%, t(0:1): Panel 4 shows a comparison of the
actual ratio of total government expenditures to GDP to the models linear tax
rate,  t:
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Figure 8: Estimated state variables in the UK from 1962 - 2011. The rst
panel shows the productivity growth multiplier. The second panel show the
standard deviation or dispersion of productivity. The third panel shows two
productivity indexes: TFP and wt which is based on the productivity of the
median worker. The fourth panel shows the productivity of the last person
who voluntarily chooses not to work.
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Figure 9: A comparison of actual data and model calculations for France 1978
- 2009. Panel 1 shows a comparison of the actual rate of real per capita GDP
growth to the models calculated rate of real per capita income growth, t:
Panel 2 shows a comparison of the actual average fraction of full time hours
worked per engaged person to the models calculated average fraction of full
time worked per employed person, Lt: Panel 3 shows a comparison of the actual
share of income earned by the top 10% to the models calculated fraction of
total income earned by the top 10%, t(0:1): Panel 4 shows a comparison of the
actual ratio of total government expenditures to GDP to the models linear tax
rate,  t:
31
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
G
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
S
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
Productivity Index
TFP
W
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Nu
Figure 10: Estimated state variables in France from 1978 - 2009. The rst
panel shows the productivity growth multiplier. The second panel show the
standard deviation or dispersion of productivity. The third panel shows two
productivity indexes: TFP and wt which is based on the productivity of the
median worker. The fourth panel shows the productivity of the last person
who voluntarily chooses not to work.
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8.4 Technological Specialization and the Dispersion of Pro-
ductivity
In all three countries, an important cause for the change in the distribution of
productivity is technological specialization. New technologies result in diver-
gent growth in productivity, which increase st. Increased returns to special-
ization cause the distribution of relative productivity to widen. Evidently, as
shown in Panel 2 of Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, there has been a signicant widen-
ing in the dispersion of relative productivity, st; in the U.S., UK and France,
respectively. This dispersion has been attributed to the growth of computer
technology.15 Those who are able to lever their skills through technology
have become relatively more productive in comparison with the median worker.
This technological change has increased the growth rate of the economy and the
dispersion of pre-tax income.
8.5 Statistics
We nd the standard errors of the model parameters using the outer product
of gradients estimator. The two unknown parameters in each country are the
number of annual hours comprising full time work, F; and the maximum fraction
of time devoted to work, :
 F
US 1967 - 2011 0.86 1917
T-stats (98) (187)
US 1950 - 2011 0.74 2196
T-stats (40) (91)
UK 1962 - 2011 0.79 2380
T-stats (19) (29)
UK 1977 - 2011 0.91 1902
T-stats (56) (73).
FR 1978 - 2009 0.89 1959
T-stats (75) (55)
Table 3: Estimated model parameters and their T-statstics.The estimates are
asymptotically consistent.
Our estimated parameters are shown in Table 3. In the Appendix we report
the state variables and their t-statistics. All of the estimated state variables
are signicant at the 1% level.
15See Gordon (2002). More recently Gordon and Mokyr have joined in a lively debate over
whether continued technological change will fuel future productivity growth Aeppel (2014).
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9 Conclusion
Our contribution to the large and very diverse literature on growth and income
distribution takes the form of a general equilibrium model of growth in labor
income and consumption. The tax rate, as measured by the total government
burden, and the amount spent on redistribution are endogenous variables. In
developed, democratic countries voters chose the tax rate in as series of single
issue elections. Since the model has no uncertainty, voters know that todays
vote may be reversed at a future election. The budget is balanced, so spending
and tax collections are equal. By assumption, all spending is for redistribution.
The model extends our earlier work on a static economy, Meltzer and Richard (1981),
to a growing economy. Consumers are endowed with di¤erent levels of rela-
tive productivity. In our model, absolute labor productivity changes as workers
learn more productive skills on the job and relative productivity changes as tech-
nology changes.16 This changes relative and absolute incomes and the spread
between the top and the bottom (or other aspects) of the income distribution.
Our model analyzes consumption over time. Consumption is an endogenous
variable that depends, inter alia, on taxation. Voters choose the tax rate in con-
tinuous elections. Sometimes they choose to increase current consumption by
increasing tax rates and redistribution. Since higher tax rates reduce spending
on learning by doing, the growth rate falls. Voters can vote to increase growth
by subsequently voting to reduce tax rates to increase future consumption. The
spread between top and bottom of the income distribution declines. Estimation
of the model shows good correspondence to the historical data for the tax rate,
average hours worked per employed person, the distribution of pre-tax income,
and the growth rate of the economy which means the model captures the main
facts about redistribution and economic growth.
The model answers the puzzling result emphasized by Piketty (2014). As
did Karl Marx, Piketty concludes that because the return on capital repeatedly
exceeds the growth rate of developed economies and does not change much over
time, developed economies will face ever-increasing capital stocks. Since returns
to capital go mainly to the highest income groups, the distribution of income
widens over time and will continue to do so. Another possibility, of course, is
that capital owners either consume or donate to charity the capital output in
excess of the economic growth rate, so that capital does not accumulate faster
than the economy grows. The puzzle for Pikettys conjecture is why there is
no evidence anywhere that the capital stock has approached saturation. That
fact opens the way for an alternative explanation of the relative constancy of
the return to capital. Unlike Piketty who bases his conclusion on a comparison
of the before tax income of the top 1 or 0.1 percent to before redistribution to
the lowest income groups, we compare incomes available for consumption by the
di¤erent income classes. Pikettys choice greatly overstates what has happened
in developed countries. Our measure is more closely related to income after
16Each workers place in the distribution of relative productivity remains xed throughout
time, but the entire distribution of relative productivity can widen or narrow due to techno-
logical changes.
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tax and after redistribution, hence to consumption. In our model, labor is
the source of income. Unlike the return to capital, the return to labor has
increased considerably over time. It is subject to cyclical and other changes
in relative share. And it changes with productivity growth, thereby increasing
at times the relative shares of those in the working classes while reducing their
relative share in periods of low growth, and therefore consumption. As Kuznets
conjectured, we must look to changes in labor income to explain changes in the
spread between high and low income shares. Data for the three countries we
study support our model and the Kuznetsconjecture.
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A Data Appendix
In this Appendix we report the state estimates and their T-statistics. We nd
the standard errors of the model parameters using the outer product of gradients
estimator. Because we calculate gt from equation (61) as a function of ln(t)
we report ln(t) as the rst state variable instead of gt and st as the second
state variable. The estimates for the US in 1967-2011 using the ratio of mean
to median household income as a measure of income dispersion are reported in
Table 4. Because of the sensitivity of the log-likelihood to state changes, all of
the estimated states are signicant at the 1% level. Next, in Tables 5 and its
continuation in 6, we report the state estimates for the US from 1950-2011 using
the income share of the top 10% as a measure of income dispersion. Again all
estimates are signicant at the 1% level. Finally, we report the state estimates
and T-statistics for the UK from 1977-2011, the UK from 1962-2011, and France
from 1978-2009 in Tables 6, 8, and 9, respectively. Once again, all estimates
are signicant at the 1% level.
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ln() T-Statistic S T-Statistic
Dec-67 -6.50 -15.17 0.46 18.39
Dec-68 -5.82 -25.35 0.50 36.42
Dec-69 -5.68 -25.31 0.51 40.86
Dec-70 -5.55 -13.47 0.51 19.43
Dec-71 -5.27 -22.76 0.53 41.74
Dec-72 -4.99 -32.57 0.56 74.61
Dec-73 -5.02 -37.88 0.57 111.08
Dec-74 -5.04 -3.19 0.54 6.70
Dec-75 -4.94 -6.74 0.54 15.45
Dec-76 -4.74 -20.07 0.57 56.19
Dec-77 -4.64 -23.47 0.59 75.59
Dec-78 -4.70 -35.23 0.59 121.31
Dec-79 -4.69 -26.15 0.59 76.37
Dec-80 -4.66 -16.55 0.57 19.26
Dec-81 -4.53 -25.70 0.59 39.30
Dec-82 -4.44 -28.11 0.57 46.08
Dec-83 -4.22 -11.81 0.61 36.92
Dec-84 -4.13 -32.77 0.64 107.16
Dec-85 -4.09 -31.50 0.65 104.66
Dec-86 -4.05 -26.78 0.65 86.49
Dec-87 -4.02 -19.30 0.65 61.98
Dec-88 -4.01 -21.24 0.66 68.84
Dec-89 -3.93 -13.90 0.67 43.70
Dec-90 -3.97 -19.15 0.66 56.41
Dec-91 -3.91 -21.61 0.65 37.87
Dec-92 -3.76 -8.62 0.67 30.97
Dec-93 -3.51 -32.70 0.70 107.85
Dec-94 -3.47 -20.38 0.73 63.11
Dec-95 -3.55 -13.89 0.72 22.43
Dec-96 -3.52 -4.74 0.73 10.96
Dec-97 -3.51 -9.41 0.74 20.78
Dec-98 -3.58 -16.36 0.74 40.65
Dec-99 -3.56 -9.98 0.75 26.38
Dec-00 -3.51 -9.56 0.76 40.00
Dec-01 -3.38 -34.91 0.76 115.02
Dec-02 -3.40 -23.59 0.75 69.91
Dec-03 -3.37 -18.22 0.76 38.76
Dec-04 -3.37 -8.84 0.76 11.07
Dec-05 -3.35 -14.94 0.76 30.69
Dec-06 -3.31 -25.47 0.77 59.75
Dec-07 -3.42 -13.65 0.75 44.71
Dec-08 -3.32 -32.59 0.74 109.62
Dec-09 -3.15 -39.05 0.73 167.76
Dec-10 -3.13 -28.46 0.75 100.24
Dec-11 -3.08 -40.90 0.76 154.59
Table 4: Estimated states and t-statistics for the US 1967-2011.
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ln() T-Statistic S T-Statistic
Dec-50 -2.88 -3.75 0.82 6.05
Dec-51 -2.77 -18.54 0.86 43.82
Dec-52 -2.75 -22.91 0.84 53.59
Dec-53 -2.72 -26.06 0.85 67.66
Dec-54 -2.94 -4.52 0.78 13.32
Dec-55 -2.90 -8.81 0.81 27.20
Dec-56 -2.96 -11.84 0.79 22.70
Dec-57 -2.93 -14.94 0.78 23.99
Dec-58 -3.00 -16.09 0.74 23.70
Dec-59 -2.85 -12.01 0.79 21.70
Dec-60 -2.89 -12.57 0.78 18.49
Dec-61 -2.88 -10.72 0.77 15.45
Dec-62 -2.78 -7.46 0.80 18.31
Dec-63 -2.77 -8.22 0.80 19.98
Dec-64 -2.75 -12.14 0.82 36.16
Dec-65 -2.75 -16.41 0.83 47.43
Dec-66 -2.62 -22.60 0.85 61.33
Dec-67 -2.56 -21.97 0.84 58.20
Dec-68 -2.49 -24.73 0.85 67.84
Dec-69 -2.52 -22.23 0.84 60.28
Dec-70 -2.52 -16.89 0.81 45.71
Dec-71 -2.49 -15.14 0.80 42.93
Dec-72 -2.46 -19.68 0.82 52.83
Dec-73 -2.42 -19.78 0.84 59.47
Dec-74 -2.44 -12.76 0.81 29.83
Dec-75 -2.45 -8.86 0.78 12.68
Dec-76 -2.40 -14.22 0.81 27.41
Dec-77 -2.39 -19.09 0.82 36.03
Dec-78 -2.35 -22.13 0.84 47.58
Dec-79 -2.37 -25.30 0.83 43.07
Dec-80 -2.37 -18.89 0.81 23.81
Dec-81 -2.33 -22.21 0.81 30.07
Dec-82 -2.33 -12.83 0.79 16.69
Dec-83 -2.31 -8.81 0.80 13.67
Dec-84 -2.24 -11.23 0.84 29.63
Dec-85 -2.21 -11.99 0.85 31.08
Dec-86 -2.16 -12.10 0.86 32.18
Dec-87 -2.13 -2.70 0.87 11.75
Dec-88 -2.07 -6.80 0.89 25.48
Dec-89 -2.06 -6.62 0.90 22.58
Dec-90 -2.01 -4.89 0.90 21.50
Table 5: Estimated states and t-statistics for the US 1950-2011, part 1
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ln() T-Statistic S T-Statistic
Dec-91 -2.04 -8.73 0.87 30.61
Dec-92 -1.97 -14.51 0.89 46.26
Dec-93 -2.00 -14.13 0.89 44.69
Dec-94 -2.00 -13.13 0.90 44.16
Dec-95 -1.99 -17.19 0.90 56.19
Dec-96 -1.96 -14.84 0.92 59.93
Dec-97 -1.96 -15.79 0.93 65.29
Dec-98 -1.96 -15.41 0.94 67.86
Dec-99 -1.94 -15.34 0.96 71.12
Dec-00 -1.90 -13.49 0.98 67.62
Dec-01 -1.90 -11.98 0.96 55.97
Dec-02 -1.89 -13.49 0.96 62.29
Dec-03 -1.86 -15.60 0.96 69.68
Dec-04 -1.83 -16.46 0.97 77.81
Dec-05 -1.79 -20.21 0.98 94.65
Dec-06 -1.77 -21.73 0.99 103.33
Dec-07 -1.75 -22.95 0.99 108.31
Dec-08 -1.71 -25.25 0.98 114.23
Dec-09 -1.68 -28.85 0.95 114.80
Dec-10 -1.65 -30.53 0.96 121.55
Dec-11 -1.67 -31.05 0.97 122.31
Table 6: Estimated states and t-statistics for the US 1950-2011, part 2
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ln() T-Statistic S T-Statistic
Dec-77 -6.47 -8.19 0.42 9.95
Dec-78 -6.27 -10.09 0.44 14.50
Dec-79 -5.96 -9.46 0.46 14.04
Dec-80 -6.12 -7.77 0.43 8.83
Dec-81 -5.61 -11.95 0.46 18.15
Dec-82 -5.30 -7.12 0.48 8.12
Dec-83 -5.15 -8.76 0.51 11.07
Dec-84 -5.15 -9.81 0.52 13.92
Dec-85 -4.93 -8.74 0.54 11.71
Dec-86 -4.76 -9.02 0.57 13.16
Dec-87 -4.71 -8.73 0.59 13.65
Dec-88 -4.74 -10.00 0.60 18.16
Dec-89 -5.07 -6.01 0.58 15.72
Dec-90 -4.74 -11.71 0.60 30.67
Dec-91 -4.89 -9.73 0.57 20.57
Dec-92 -4.79 -8.35 0.57 13.73
Dec-93 -4.50 -5.66 0.59 8.29
Dec-94 -4.45 -5.18 0.61 16.28
Dec-95 -4.62 -10.54 0.59 27.66
Dec-96 -4.64 -6.35 0.59 17.53
Dec-97 -4.60 -4.65 0.60 6.82
Dec-98 -4.61 -7.39 0.61 14.63
Dec-99 -4.62 -9.66 0.61 20.06
Dec-00 -4.62 -11.20 0.62 23.42
Dec-01 -4.43 -9.30 0.63 11.94
Dec-02 -4.58 -12.90 0.61 25.92
Dec-03 -4.60 -14.21 0.60 35.07
Dec-04 -4.60 -13.75 0.59 30.28
Dec-05 -4.40 -6.29 0.60 6.65
Dec-06 -4.28 -11.33 0.61 13.59
Dec-07 -4.44 -14.29 0.60 26.60
Dec-08 -4.41 -14.14 0.58 18.18
Dec-09 -4.21 -13.86 0.57 25.86
Dec-10 -3.94 -11.73 0.60 21.48
Dec-11 -4.09 -11.58 0.58 18.69
Table 7: Estimated states and t-statistics for the UK 1977-2011
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ln() T-Statistic S T-Statistic
Dec-62 -3.40 -7.76 0.61 12.89
Dec-63 -3.28 -6.75 0.64 11.69
Dec-64 -3.11 -6.85 0.68 12.65
Dec-65 -3.04 -7.04 0.68 12.76
Dec-66 -2.98 -7.69 0.68 13.86
Dec-67 -2.84 -8.13 0.68 15.76
Dec-68 -2.77 -8.39 0.69 17.07
Dec-69 -2.90 -8.10 0.67 15.04
Dec-70 -2.85 -7.97 0.68 13.66
Dec-71 -2.78 -7.91 0.68 12.82
Dec-72 -2.72 -8.61 0.70 14.43
Dec-73 -2.57 -10.70 0.74 20.70
Dec-74 -2.47 -10.54 0.71 21.69
Dec-75 -2.45 -9.77 0.69 19.71
Dec-76 -2.50 -9.00 0.69 17.76
Dec-77 -2.64 -5.10 0.69 12.74
Dec-78 -2.54 -6.58 0.71 15.94
Dec-79 -2.46 -7.03 0.72 18.57
Dec-80 -2.48 -4.77 0.69 11.55
Dec-81 -2.44 -2.86 0.68 4.50
Dec-82 -2.31 -2.11 0.71 3.97
Dec-83 -2.30 -4.42 0.73 6.16
Dec-84 -2.25 -4.94 0.75 7.07
Dec-85 -2.20 -5.17 0.78 8.14
Dec-86 -2.14 -7.07 0.80 11.37
Dec-87 -2.15 -8.40 0.82 12.89
Dec-88 -2.15 -9.32 0.84 15.15
Dec-89 -2.18 -9.11 0.85 13.46
Dec-90 -2.14 -10.32 0.84 14.55
Dec-91 -2.08 -9.54 0.84 14.78
Dec-92 -1.99 -8.99 0.85 14.80
Dec-93 -1.89 -7.16 0.87 11.30
Dec-94 -1.85 -6.19 0.89 9.72
Dec-95 -1.81 -5.81 0.91 8.88
Dec-96 -1.80 -6.49 0.92 10.11
Dec-97 -1.81 -7.06 0.93 11.22
Dec-98 -1.81 -8.17 0.94 13.45
Dec-99 -1.78 -8.33 0.95 14.35
Dec-00 -1.77 -9.21 0.97 16.47
Dec-01 -1.75 -9.74 0.97 18.19
Dec-02 -1.71 -9.01 0.97 15.99
Dec-03 -1.67 -10.17 0.98 19.86
Dec-04 -1.66 -10.68 0.97 23.64
Dec-05 -1.62 -9.08 0.97 15.78
Dec-06 -1.58 -7.64 0.98 13.40
Dec-07 -1.57 -7.58 0.99 13.39
Dec-08 -1.54 -7.20 0.97 13.33
Dec-09 -1.49 -5.47 0.94 11.50
Dec-10 -1.55 -7.33 0.92 16.03
Dec-11 -1.49 -2.93 0.93 4.43
Table 8: Estimated states and t-statistics for the UK 1962-2011.
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ln() T-Statistic S T-Statistic
Dec-78 -3.37 -13.45 0.70 23.48
Dec-79 -3.30 -11.79 0.71 20.02
Dec-80 -3.29 -11.64 0.70 19.50
Dec-81 -3.19 -12.44 0.70 20.63
Dec-82 -3.00 -10.81 0.71 16.77
Dec-83 -2.97 -8.41 0.71 11.04
Dec-84 -2.91 -8.45 0.72 10.84
Dec-85 -2.79 -5.33 0.73 6.59
Dec-86 -2.77 -4.07 0.74 5.16
Dec-87 -2.77 -6.81 0.74 8.63
Dec-88 -2.71 -9.09 0.77 11.81
Dec-89 -2.66 -7.97 0.79 13.71
Dec-90 -2.62 -9.10 0.79 14.91
Dec-91 -2.61 -9.14 0.78 15.55
Dec-92 -2.58 -11.79 0.78 18.07
Dec-93 -2.52 -12.42 0.76 17.94
Dec-94 -2.52 -10.87 0.77 16.54
Dec-95 -2.45 -9.63 0.78 18.43
Dec-96 -2.47 -10.34 0.77 19.77
Dec-97 -2.44 -8.93 0.78 20.46
Dec-98 -2.42 -9.11 0.80 22.25
Dec-99 -2.36 -11.25 0.81 24.69
Dec-00 -2.29 -18.66 0.83 31.44
Dec-01 -2.29 -18.98 0.83 29.88
Dec-02 -2.21 -20.91 0.83 32.38
Dec-03 -2.20 -20.53 0.82 30.25
Dec-04 -2.22 -18.62 0.83 28.81
Dec-05 -2.22 -20.10 0.83 34.99
Dec-06 -2.19 -21.99 0.83 38.44
Dec-07 -2.21 -20.83 0.83 34.53
Dec-08 -2.24 -19.08 0.82 28.04
Dec-09 -2.20 -16.59 0.79 21.48
Table 9: Estimated states and t-statistics for the France 1978-2009
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